In Religion in the Making, Whitehead sets the stage for an interesting paradox that runs through his whole philosophical work. On the one hand, he defines metaphysics as clearly and succinctly as possible, namely as "the science which seeks to discover the general ideas which are indispensable to the analysis of everything that happens" (RM 84n1).
2 logic and language of limit, where logic and language themselves dissolve-and are born at the same time. 3 It goes without saying that I don't believe that Whitehead invented this "method" only in his works after Process and Reality; on the contrary, if one looks closely enough, everything is already right there, sometimes right under the surface of the obvious agenda of the construction of a metaphysics as a "coherent, logical and necessary system" (PR 3). 4 However, against any claim that the works after Process and Reality, which we could tentatively call Whitehead's "late"
works, are just recombinations and popularized versions of his "mature" work, or examples of a declining mind hanging on to main ideas by way of sweeping simplification, I would like to offer the thesis that these "late" works between Symbolism and the last articles from 1941 are a series of new attempts to articulate the main paradox of what Whitehead understood as metaphysics.
5
In a sense, I tend to think that this is the true meaning of what, for Whitehead, lays beyond metaphysics or that this "beyond" is precisely the articulation of its paradoxical nature that indicates that we can never overcome metaphysical claims in seeking the generality of ideas but that we are, at the same time, already always beyond its "nature" to formulate the general as such. 6 In this sense, I understand Gilles Deleuze's affinity to Whitehead not as a poststructuralist misinterpretation of Whitehead's intention but as a true fulfillment of the deeper status of his metaphysics as the infinite adventure of ideas (DR 284-5). 7 Hence, two of Deleuze's comments on Whitehead will guide my own exploration of Whitehead's "late" series of deconstructions of the status of metaphysical claims. Like Deleuze, I
also think that Whitehead was a pluralist and empiricist in the peculiar sense that he defended the idea that "abstraction does not explain but must be explained" and that "the search is not for an eternal or universal, but for the conditions under which something new is created (creativeness)"
(TRM 304). 8 Hence, I share the conviction of Deleuze that Whitehead is not following a paradigm of "eternity," that is, that the "best of all worlds is not the one that reproduces the eternal," but that it is the one that allows for "the production of novelty" (TF 79).
9
With Deleuze, I think that Whitehead's series of deconstructions of the metaphysical paradox is based on the exploration of novelty, creativeness, and the incomprehensibility of experience in such a way that is tantamount to nothing less than a fundamental "conversion of philosophy" (TF 79). 10 I will further explore this suggestion in a series of four theses that increasingly will reveal the status of all metaphysical claims to be essentially incomplete in such a way that they only can be understood from a perspective of non-exceedable or, if you will, un- It is an interesting philosophical gesture that Whitehead, in formulating a desire for metaphysics, accompanied every instantiation of such metaphysics with its relative impossibility.
12
In early works, like Concept of Nature, Whitehead was still withholding metaphysical claims, although he was hinting at the necessity of formulating a new metaphysics in the near future, based on his analysis that the implicit metaphysics of physics was mechanistic and that this mechanicism was neither scientific nor necessary; in fact it excluded what is the basis of its own endeavor, namely, nature as experienced. 13 While he was still excluding such a metaphysical endeavor, he laid the ground for its formulation and its relative impossibility when he defined nature as "the mystery of creative passage of nature" (CN 72 14 "The passage of nature which is only another name for the creative force of existence has no narrow ledge of definite instantaneous present within which to operate. Its operative presence which is now urging nature forward must be sought for throughout the whole, in the remotest past as well as in the narrowest breadth of any present duration. Perhaps also in the unrealised future. Perhaps also in the future which might be as well as the actual future which will be. It is impossible to meditate on time and the mystery of the creative passage of nature without an overwhelming emotion at the limitations of human intelligence." (CN 72) and its knowledge (CN 173). Since objects are per se immanent to events of which they are mere abstractions, Whitehead already laid the ground for the impossibility of any "objective" formulation of such structures as general enough to encompass the "creative advance" (CN 34) of a world of events.
This is the nucleus of the paradox of Whitehead's metaphysics: that it strives for a generality that is always already undermined by the creative passage of structures and the , however, with the explication of Whitehead's thought in a rhythm of creativity and rationality points in the right direction, namely the overcoming of the rationalism as the foundation for the creative process.
the genetic analysis discovers only phases of becoming in which all "givenness"-be it structures, generalities or facts-are only potentials for new becoming (PR 23).
This again is the reason that for Whitehead the "realm" of "eternal objects" is not absolute but only relative to the world-process in its ultimate irrationality-whether it is based in creativity (PR 20) or the principle of limitation (PR 46). In being relative to actuality it may not be "becoming" in itself-that is, there are no new eternal objects-but it is no well-defined "realm" either; rather it is pure multiplicity, per se chaotic, without unity, lacking any definite structure, only being unified in the actual process of becoming itself (PR 46).
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In this sweeping glance through the development of the metaphysical paradox up to
Whitehead's magnum opus, Process and Reality, we can gain the insight that the process of deconstruction of metaphysical claims is already there, right in the midst of the constitution of metaphysics; but unfortunately, it remains often undetected.
26
In the following three theses, I want to render a cumulative case that the "late" work of Whitehead's conviction that there is no "givenness" that is not based on becoming and that this becoming is a relational happening of a multiplicity of events, the immanent rationality of which are fundamentally in flux.
28
There must, however, be limits to the claim that all the elements in the universe are explicable by 'theory.' For 'theory' itself requires that there be 'given' elements so as to In both cases, Whitehead situates metaphysics-as rationality of experience-in a distinctly cultural context. 33 In both cases, Whitehead seems to "break" with his universal metaphysical vision of utmost generality; but he does so not in order to ask a reduced "anthropological" question instead; rather he situates the very existence and development of metaphysics in the history of the decaying and self-organizing tendencies of the "course of events" (FR 1) of which human evolution and humanities' cultures are a direct expression.
In both cases, Whitehead ends with visions of the utmost cultural relativity of the metaphysical endeavor. In Function of Reason, "Reason is the self-discipline of the originative element in history" (FR 3), that is, of creativity. But while it raises the process beyond "mere blind appetition [that] would be the product of chance and could lead nowhere" (FR 89) it never becomes the expression of an underlying, almost divine Reason that would lead us to an eternal point beyond this history of becoming and perishing. 34 On the contrary, it is limited by the "form specialized to the special aptitudes of human beings" and only allows for a creative arrival of unprecedented cultural developments that express a "counter-tendency which converts the decay of one order into the birth of its successor" (FR 90).
That this cultural incompleteness of metaphysics, for which there is always only a successor but never a point of rest in a final generality, is always the expression of a cultural environment is the insight with which Symbolism leaves us. The ability of a culture to establish a favourable environment and to survive a non-favourable environment is eminent in the 32 Both works are mostly consulted only as additions to PR's discourses on reason and perception; in their integrity, however, they reveal the relativizing effect they have on metaphysics. Hence, none of these cultural forms of symbolism represent reality per se but they always are the pragmatic expression of a success or decline of a certain cultural integrity that has no underlying reason but the historicity of its own becoming. A "symbolism which is taken to refer to the ultimate purposes for which the society exists," therefore, needs to "combine reverence to their symbols with freedom of revision" without which it must ultimately decay either from anarchy, or from the slow atrophy of a life stifled by useless shadows" (S 88).
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It goes without saying that Whitehead's pursuit of this cultural conditioning of metaphysics in his last two books Adventures of Ideas and Modes of Thought can easily be misunderstood as an "application" of his preceding metaphysics. 37 In fact, however, they are really reflections of precisely the cultural incompleteness of metaphysics. While the cultivation of metaphysics for Whitehead is a civilized act of surveying "the world with some large generality of understanding" (MT 4), it must also always be situated in the particular development, the becoming and decline, of concrete civilizations. It is with this insight that one realizes that "[r]ationalism never shakes off its status of an experimental adventure" (PR 9) of ideas, potentials, structures, and laws of any magnitude of universality by being embedded in, and expressions of, the relativity of history, culture, society, and the universal course of events.
Because of this immanence of rationality, Whitehead concludes that we "cannot produce that final adjustment of well-defined generalities which constitute a complete metaphysics"; we can always only produce "a variety of partial systems of limited generality" (AI 145). This "process is, of course, unending. All that can be achieved is the emphasis on a few large-scale notions, together with attention to the variety of other ideas which arise in the display of those chosen for primary emphasis" (MT 2).
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In light of the weight that the "late" works of Whitehead around and after Process and Reality lay on issues of social and cultural analysis, we must either conclude that Whitehead lost his metaphysical interest-hence, that he did indeed formulate his metaphysics in Process and Reality-or that these "late" works are a series of deconstructions of the metaphysical claim that already appeared underlying Whitehead's metaphysical construction in Process and Reality. 39 In the second case-and this is the thesis here-these "late" works are the very expression of the fundamental incompleteness of metaphysics in the relativity of its cultural constitution, articulation, scope, and flavour; an incompleteness, however, that does not leave metaphysics behind but deconstructs it as the moment of its constitution. In this sense, says Whitehead in
Adventures of Ideas, it is not the metaphysical constructions of generalities themselves but their
38 "Philosophy is the attitude of mind toward doctrines ignorantly entertained. By the phrase 'ignorantly entertained' I mean that the full meaning of the doctrine in respect to the infinitude of circumstances to which it is relevant, is not understood. The philosophic attitude … refuses to be satisfied by the conventional presupposition that every sensible person knows the answer. As soon as you rest satisfied with primitive ideas, and with primitive propositions, you have ceased to be a philosopher. This limitation is, first of all, a limitation of abstraction in the attempt to use them to gain an understanding of the actual process; it is based on actual incompleteness. Secondly, it is a limitation given by the historicity and cultural embededness of the process of actuality. Thirdly, however, it is a limitation of principality as such in the course of the process. 44 The "fallacy of misplaced concreteness" is not just a statement on the status of metaphysical claims in differentiation from "reality," but also a statement about the "reality" itself insofar as it cannot be conceptualized. Hence, principles and categories ought to be incomplete not because we are limited by culture and language but precisely because this limitation of principles and categories is the very condition for the conceptualization of actuality as actuality. 45 In other words, if actuality could be "rationalized," that is, universally grasped through concepts, categories, and principles, it would be only the expression of an "idea" (Plato) or a "spirit" (Hegel) of which it was only a variation or exemplification.
Of course, as soon as we have seen this transcendental incompleteness working in
Whitehead's constitution of metaphysics, many of its pieces in Process and Reality fall into place:
that the "universal of universals" is process that is the creativity beyond all forms (PR 20); that all four kinds of categories are irreducible to a law of unification, a One behind them, and that
they are actually open-ended (especially in the case of the categories of existence which per se 43 Cf. J. All that only explicates the fact that, for Whitehead, the coherence of thought is not grounded in any closed system but in a constitutional incompleteness. While it might be true that the metaphysical paradox can go unnoticed (or is even surprising) because of Whitehead's so obvious eros of rationality, that is, his striving for comprehensiveness, universality, and the "rescue from anti-intellectualism" (PR xii), 46 it is right there, in the heart of this "rationality." One is based on Plato's "seven notions, namely-The Ideas, The Physical Elements, The
Psyche, The Eros, The Harmony, The Mathematical Relations, The Receptacle," of which Whitehead thought that "all philosophy is in fact an endeavour to obtain a coherent system out of some modification of these notions" (AI 275). 49 In fact, Adventures of Ideas can be understood as a prolegomenon to such a system of modifications that conceptualizes the actual incompleteness of the world-process.
The second series is that of cultural incompleteness, that is, of "a general definition of civilization, [namely] that a civilized society is exhibiting the five qualities of Truth, Beauty, Adventure, Art, Peace." (AI 274) The later part of Adventures of Ideas can be understood to be the sketch of the implementation of these five categories of cultural incompleteness.
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A third series is roughly an expression of the transcendental incompleteness of the world process, namely the "incompleteness… [that] relates to the notion of Transcendence, the feeling essential for Adventure, Zest, and Peace." (AI 295) 51 This series expresses the very incompleteness of the world-process as such, namely that it never finds a unity that does not create a new multiplicity; that, however, any unification is not doomed in this vast process but becomes an expression of it unending novelty. 52 Here is also the place where Whitehead's "principle of limitation," which seemed to have expressed a unified notion of "God," disperses in a multiplicity of concepts-Supreme Adventure, initial Eros, final Fact, Harmonies of Harmonies, Adventure of the Universe as One, the union of Zest with Peace, final Beauty, tragic Beauty, the Great Fact (AI 295-6).
In a final move in Whitehead's last article "Mathematics and the Good," 53 Whitehead even infects even his earlier version of ultimate concepts, categories and principles with this transcendental incompleteness, that is, he begins to reconstruct whatever ultimacy one could pose in Whitehead's "system" and lays open the underlying rationality of such a serialization. It is based on the reversal of the assumption of transcendental completeness that was infused by the primacy of infinity (and eternity); instead, now, finitude (and novelty) becomes primary. 54 From the generative energy of this intersection of immanent infinitude and, hence, a multiplicity of series of actualities, Whitehead now derives all of his ultimate notions of process in which they mutually deconstruct each other. 55 Whitehead explains that the "notion of 'understanding' requires some grasp of how the finitude of the entity in question requires infinity, and also some notion of how infinity requires finitude. 56 This search for such an understanding is the definition of philosophy" (MG 106; italics added). The world now has no unity, except that of finite actualities; creativity arises in "the awakening of infinitude to finite activity" (MG 111);
possibilities are "abstraction involved in the creation of any actuality, with its union of finitude
Whitehead's Philosophy (New York: Fordham.1983). But it is his deconstruction of the grounding ideal of "infinity" as "ultimate reality" that remains in the background as "substantialist remainder" that he addresses in MG in a manner that is unprecedented insofar as it now has consequences for Whitehead's own "ultimates."
with infinity" (MG 112-113); and so on.
If we-in formulating the transcendental incompleteness of actuality-want to summarize this development in the "late" work of Whitehead, we can do so with a "metaphysical principle"
Whitehead invokes in Adventures of Ideas really as a principle that defies all principles, a "principium sine principio," that indeed is the transcendental condition of pure becoming:
namely, that "the very essence of real actuality-that is, of the completely real-is process. Thus each actual thing is only to be understood in terms of its becoming and perishing." Hence, for
Whitehead, "no static maintenance of perfection is possible" (AI 274); unity is "Imperfection" The maybe most imminent structural appearance of this paradox in Process and Reality is Whitehead's definition of "necessity" in his formulation of a metaphysical scheme of ideas.
Although it might be widely conceived as the cornerstone and proof of Whitehead's rationalism, 58 it is actually the opposite: a formulation of universal relativity; it is the very ground for the limitation of rationality by essential incompleteness. Thus the philosophic scheme should be 'necessary,' in the sense of bearing in itself its claims of the world, namely to be process and extension. 62 In Process and Reality, the relation 60 "To sum up: the termini for thought are entities, primarily with bare individuality, secondarily with properties and relations ascribed to them in the procedure of thought; the termini for sense-awareness are factors in the fact of nature, primarily relata and only secondarily discriminated as distinct individualities." (CN 12-3)
61 "I will not repeat myself now, except to remind you that my theory involves the entire abandonment of the notion that simple location is the primary way in which things are involved in space-time. In a certain sense, everything is everywhere at all times. For every location involves an aspect of itself in every other location. Thus every spatiotemporal standpoint mirrors the world." (SMW 91) 62 Cf. Kraus (1998) ch. Universality of truth arises from the universality of relativity, whereby every particular actual thing lays upon the universe the obligation of conforming to it. Thus in the analysis of particular fact universal truths are discoverable, those truths expressing this obligation. This "common function" of whatever happens is not any "property," it is not a "form," it is more like Plato's "place," the khora, "'a natural matrix for all things'. It receives its forms by 67 Cf. Laws, all laws must be immanent (AI113); when there is no One beyond this immanence, there can be no external God but only self-creativity or immanent creativity (AI 236); when there is no unity as ground or goal, all unity must be becoming and perishing. 73 Immanence creates multiplicity of becoming and its mutuality-essential incompleteness.
3) In his last lecture "Immortality," held 1941 in Harvard, Whitehead explores unoccupied territory. Clearer then ever before, and maybe for the first time in this sense ever, he formulates mutual immanence in such a way that it directly exposes the deepest meaning of the metaphysical puzzle that has energized his thought throughout his whole career. 74 He restates metaphysical universality in terms of the mutual immanence of all concepts, categories, and principles in such a way that we recognize that we can never really formulate the process of the universe, but in doing so never transcend this process either. Whitehead makes three claims in this regard.
Firstly, Whitehead makes the claim that there is "finitude-unless this were true, infinity would have no meaning." Hence, he concludes that the "contrast of finitude and infinity arises from the fundamental metaphysical truth that every entity involves an indefinite array of perspectives…But any finite perspective does not enable an entity to shake off its essential connection with totality." There is always an unanalyzed "infinite background" that any entity presupposes "which is the universe in its relation to that entity" (Imm. 682). 75 In other words, immanence of infinity and finitude that generates these multiplicities of categories and principles.
Secondly, the question remains how infinity and finitude and generative categories of analysis relate to one another so as to fulfill this mutual immanence. Whitehead answers with his most daring move. In analyzing the universe into two multiplicities, namely the worlds of actualities and values, Whitehead claims that "the description of either of the two Worlds involves stages which include characteristics borrowed from the other World" (Imm. 685). Here, we face the center of the essential incompleteness: that whatever we say in analysis we can only say by synthesis; and that this synthesis contrasts the mutual exclusion of categories, principles and concepts in analyzing the universe into formulations of their mutually immanent relationship. 76 Even more, because the contrasting series of concepts, categories, or principles must "include characteristics derived from the other," these "major examples of perspectives of the universe" to the extent that they "require each other" (Imm. 685; italics added), exhibit the universal incompleteness of all metaphysical claims.
Thirdly and lastly, only in their mutual incompleteness can metaphysical claims exhibit "the concrete Universe in its relation to either of its … aspects" (Imm. 684-5; italics added).
However, since any aspect "considered by itself it is an abstraction" from the Universe, it is always only in their mutuality that metaphysical claims approximate the concrete. Indeed, Whitehead's "late" work finally addresses the paradox of a metaphysical claim without invoking any "unity" that names "the same" in the difference of aspects, but only names the differences themselves in their mutually creative dynamic.
